

KIDA LIN

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1. RESEARCH INTERESTS

AOS: Ethics, political philosophy
AOC: Philosophy of law

2. ACADEMIC POSITIONS

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
Non-stipendiary Lecturer (Jan 2024 – Jun 2024)

LADY MARGARET HALL, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
Non-stipendiary Lecturer (Sep 2023 – Jun 2024)

LINCOLN COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
Non-stipendiary Lecturer (Apr 2023 – Dec 2023)

3. EDUCATION

Primary

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD (CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE)
DPhil in Philosophy (Oct 2022 – exp. Aug 2026)
Thesis: *Give Peace a Chance*
Advisors: Jeff McMahan, Alex Kaiserman, and Sandy Steel

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD (SOMERVILLE COLLEGE)
BPhil in Philosophy (Oct 2020 – Jun 2022)
Advisor: Jeff McMahan

AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
BA (Hons) in Philosophy (Jul 2018 – Oct 2019)
Advisor: Seth Lazar

UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY
BA in Philosophy; Government and International Relations
(Feb 2016 – Jun 2018)

Visiting

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

Recognised Visiting Student (Sep 2025 – Dec 2025)

Advisors: Michael Otsuka and Alec Walen

UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK

Recognised Visiting Student (Jan 2023 – Mar 2023)

Advisors: Victor Tadros and Patrick Tomlin

4. WORK IN PROGRESS

- (3) “The Myth of the “Just” War” (in preparation)
- (2) “Requirements and Coercion in War” (under review, *Ethics*)

Suppose that 1,000 innocent people will be killed by a runaway trolley unless Y diverts it onto a side track where it will kill X. Y announces that he does not plan to intervene. Z then coerces Y to do so – she credibly threatens that, unless he does, she will break both his arms. I argue that (1) X would not, if the choice were hers, be required to divert the trolley towards herself; (2) because of (1), Y is not required to divert the trolley towards X; and (3) because of (2), Z is not permitted to coerce Y to divert the trolley. I then consider this argument’s implications for war. I argue that just combatants are the moral equivalents of Y; just decision-makers are the moral equivalents of Z; and the innocent people whom just combatants will inevitably kill if they fight in a war are the moral equivalents of X. The takeaway, I shall show, is a plausible form of ad bellum pacifism.

- (1) “Minor Threateners and Wrongful Killings in War” (revise and resubmit, *Free & Equal*)

Most killings in war are wrongful. Drawing on a novel puzzle – the Puzzle of Minor Torturers – I argue that such killings violate either proportionality or necessity. While there can be killings that satisfy both proportionality and necessity – this depends in part on adopting a particular conception of how we apply the two constraints – we ought, evidence-relatively, not to kill. Specifically, I defend the Knowledge Requirement on Permissible Killing: if we know that our act involves killing, the act is evidence-relatively permissible if and only if we know that it satisfies both evidence-relative proportionality and evidence-relative necessity. The upshot, I shall show, is a plausible form of pacifism.

5. PRESENTATIONS

Talks

- (39) “Requirements and Coercion in War”, Annual Meeting, PPE Society London (exp. Jul 2026)

- (38) “Secondary Liability”, Joint Session, Aristotelian Society and Mind Association (exp. Jul 2026)
- (37) “Requirements and Coercion in War”, comments by Leo Rogers, Work-in-Progress in Political Theory Seminar, University of Oxford (exp. Jun 2026)
- (36) “Requirements and Coercion in War”, comments by Saba Bazargan-Forward, Early Career Workshop, Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace (May 2026)
- (35) “Requirements and Coercion in War”, Papers in Progress Workshop, Eastern Division Meeting, American Philosophical Association (Jan 2026)
- (34) “Minor Torturers and Wrongful Killings in War”, Eastern Division Meeting, American Philosophical Association (Jan 2026)
- (33) “Minor Torturers and Wrongful Killings in War”, Value Theory Discussion Group, Rutgers University (Oct 2025)
- (32) “Minor Torturers and Wrongful Killings in War”, Philosophy, Ethics, and Killing Workshop (Jul 2025)
- (31) “When is Suboptimal Supererogation Wrong?”, Annual Conference, Society for Applied Philosophy (Jun 2025)
- (30) “Requirements and Coercion in War”, Lateran Graduate Conference, Promoting Peace: Philosophy, Theology, and Peace Studies, Pontifical Lateran University (Jun 2025)
- (29) “Requirements and Coercion in War”, comments by Max Klinger, Work-in-Progress in Political Theory Seminar, University of Oxford (Jun 2025)
- (28) “Minor Threateners and Wrongful Killings in War”, comments by Cécile Fabre, DPhil Seminar in Philosophy, University of Oxford (May 2025)
- (27) “Minor Threateners and Wrongful Killings in War”, Symposium, Political, Legal, and Moral Philosophy Research Group, Central European University (May 2025)
- (26) “Minor Threateners and Wrongful Killings in War”, comments by Xihe Ouyang, Graduate Philosophy Conference, University of Calgary (May 2025)
- (25) “Minor Threateners and Wrongful Killings in War”, International Graduate Conference, National University of Ireland, Galway (Apr 2025)
- (24) “Minor Threateners and Wrongful Killings in War”, Work-in-Progress Talk, Corpus Christi College Philosophy Society, University of Oxford (Mar 2025)
- (23) “Minor Threateners and Wrongful Killings in War”, Nuffield Political Theory Workshop, University of Oxford (Mar 2025)
- (22) “On Bearing a Supererogatory Cost to Do the Lesser Good”, comments by Pdraig Cuffe, Work-in-Progress in Political Theory Seminar, University of Oxford (Nov 2023)

- (21) “Why Turning the Trolley is Merely Permissible”, Philosophy, Ethics, and Killing Workshop (Jul 2023)
- (20) “Why Turning the Trolley is Merely Permissible: Lesser-Evil Options, Agent-Favouring Options, and Rights Infringements”, Joint Session, Aristotelian Society and Mind Association (Jul 2023)
- (19) “Why Turning the Trolley is Merely Permissible: Lesser-Evil Options, Agent-Favouring Options, and Rights Infringements”, Annual Conference, Society for Applied Philosophy (Jun 2023)
- (18) “Why Turning the Trolley is Merely Permissible: Lesser-Evil Options, Agent-Favouring Options, and Rights Infringements”, Just War Theory Workshop, University of Warwick (Jan 2023)
- (17) “Why Turning the Trolley is Merely Permissible: Lesser-Evil Options, the Transfer of Prerogatives, and Moral Interests”, Graduate Conference in Analytic Philosophy, Beijing Normal University (Jan 2023) ***Best Paper Award***
- (16) “Why Turning the Trolley is Merely Permissible: Lesser-Evil Options, Agent-Favouring Options, and the Moral Interest in Refraining from Killing”, comments by Brian Wong, Work-in-Progress in Political Theory Seminar, University of Oxford (Jan 2023)
- (15) “Lesser-Evil Options and Agent-Centred Options”, DPhil Seminar in Philosophy, University of Oxford (Nov 2022)
- (14) “Objecting to Defensive Intervention”, Austin Graduate Ethics and Normativity Talks, University of Texas at Austin (Nov 2022)
- (13) “Objecting to Third-Party Intervention”, comments by Jonathan Parry, Graduate and Early Career Reading Retreat, Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace (Jun 2022)
- (12) “Objecting to Third-Party Intervention”, Workshop in Practical Philosophy, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics (Jun 2022)
- (11) “The Act/Sequence Puzzle of Abortion: Disaggregating, Bundling, and Moral Necessity”, comments by Alida Liberman, NYU Philosophical Bioethics Workshop, NYU Centre for Bioethics (Apr 2022) ***Graduate Student Prize Winner***
- (10) “The Act/Sequence Puzzle of Abortion: Disaggregating and Moral Necessity”, Annual Graduate Conference, New Orleans Philosophical Society (Mar 2022)
- (9) “The Beneficiary Principle and Humanitarian Intervention”, International Conference, Association for Practical and Professional Ethics (Feb 2022)
- (8) “Solving the Abortion Paradox: Disaggregating, Bundling, and Sequences”, comments by Krister Bykvist, Stockholm Graduate Conference in Philosophy, Stockholm University (Dec 2021)
- (7) “Harmless Torturer and Liability: A Puzzle”, Zagreb Applied Ethics Conference (Sep 2021)

- (6) “Harmless Torturer and Liability: A Puzzle”, comments by Dmitry Ananyev, Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, University of Colorado at Boulder (Aug 2021)
- (5) “Harmless Torturer and Liability: A Puzzle”, Annual Conference, Australasian Association of Philosophy (Jul 2021)
- (4) “Responsibility and the Moral Significance of Intervening Agency”, Joint Session, Aristotelian Society and Mind Association (Jul 2021)
- (3) “Harmless Torturer and Liability: A Puzzle”, Ockham Society, University of Oxford (Jun 2021)
- (2) “Responsibility and the Moral Significance of Intervening Agency”, comments by Clay Alsup, Annual Graduate Philosophy Conference, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (Apr 2021)
- (1) “Responsibility and the Moral Significance of Intervening Agency”, comments by Megan Kitts, Annual Rocky Mountain Philosophy Conference, University of Colorado at Boulder (Apr 2021)

Comments

- (6) Comments on *Punishment, Penalty, and Incapacitation* by Alec Walen, Criminal Law Discussion Group, University of Oxford (exp. Jun 2026)
- (5) Comments on “Guarantees of Non-Repetition & the Case for a Pluralist Framework of Reparative Justice” by Sibylle Léonard, Work-in-Progress in Political Theory Seminar, University of Oxford (exp. Jun 2026)
- (4) Comments on “Two Puzzles About Proportionate Deterrence” by Helen Frowe, Conference – Just Philosophy: A Tribute to Jeff McMahan (Jun 2025)
- (3) Comments on *Violence in Proportion* by Patrick Tomlin, Manuscript Workshop, University of Warwick (Sep 2023)
- (2) Comments on “Deception and Social Rights” by Charlie Richards, Work-in-Progress in Political Theory Seminar, University of Oxford (May 2023)
- (1) Comments on “Political Liberalism: Neutrality or Consent” by Simeon Goldstraw, Work-in-Progress in Political Theory Seminar, University of Oxford (Oct 2022)

6. TEACHING

Undergraduate Tutorials, Oxford

- (5) TT24 (Apr 2024 – Jun 2024)
 - Moral Philosophy (Prelim) – 13 students

- Practical Ethics (Final) – 1 student
 - Theory of Politics (Final) – 1 student
- (4) HT24 (Jan 2024 – Mar 2024)
- Ethics (Final) – 6 students
 - Practical Ethics (Final) – 2 students
 - Theory of Politics (Final) – 1 student
- (3) MT23 (Oct 2023 – Dec 2023)
- Ethics (Final) – 7 students
 - Practical Ethics (Final) – 3 students
- (2) TT23 (Apr 2023 – Jun 2023)
- Ethics (Final) – 4 students
 - Practical Ethics (Final) – 3 students
 - Theory of Politics (Prelim) – 13 students
- (1) HT23 (Jan 2023 – Mar 2023)
- Ethics (Final) – 4 students

Undergraduate Revision Classes, Oxford

- (2) TT24 (Apr 2024 – Jun 2024)
- Ethics (Final) – 16 students
 - Practical Ethics (Final) – 7 students
- (1) TT23 (Apr 2023 – Jun 2023)
- Ethics (Final) – 4 students
 - Moral Philosophy (Prelim) – 10 students
 - Theory of Politics (Prelim) – 13 students

Undergraduate Collection Marking, Oxford

- (4) TT24 (Apr 2024 – Jun 2024)
- Ethics (Final) – 6 scripts
 - Theory of Politics (Final) – 1 script
- (3) HT24 (Jan 2024 – Mar 2024)
- Ethics (Final) – 2 scripts
 - Practical Ethics (Final) – 2 scripts
- (2) MT23 (Oct 2023 – Dec 2023)

- Ethics (Final) – 2 scripts
- (1) TT23 (Apr 2023 – Jun 2023)
- Ethics (Final) – 8 scripts
 - Knowledge and Reality (Final) – 1 script
 - Practical Ethics (Final) – 1 script

7. SERVICE

Editorial Positions

- Co-editor, Public Philosophy Section, PEA Soup (May 2023 –)

Refereeing

- (2) 2024: *Philosophical Quarterly*; *Ergo*
- (1) 2023: *Journal of Moral Philosophy*

Index Preparation

- (4) *Violence in Proportion*, Patrick Tomlin, Oxford University Press, 2025
(May 2025 – Jun 2025)
- (3) *Derek Parfit: His Life and Thought*, edited by Jeff McMahan, Oxford University Press, 2025
(Mar 2025)
- (2) *Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit*, edited by Jeff McMahan, Tim Campbell, James Goodrich, and Ketan Ramakrishnan, Oxford University Press, 2022
(Sep 2021 – Oct 2021)
- (1) *Principles and Persons: The Legacy of Derek Parfit*, edited by Jeff McMahan, Tim Campbell, James Goodrich, and Ketan Ramakrishnan, Oxford University Press, 2021
(Feb 2021 – Mar 2021)

Administration

- Undergraduate Admissions Interviews, Lady Margaret Hall, University of Oxford (Dec 2023)

8. SELECT AWARDS

- (4) DPhil Funding, Arts and Humanities Research Council (UK) and Corpus Christi College (Oxford) (Oct 2022 – Dec 2025)
- (3) Honours Scholarship, Australian National University (Feb 2019 – Oct 2019)

- (2) Lithgow Scholarship, University of Sydney (Apr 2018)
- (1) Francis E Snare Memorial Prize, University of Sydney (Apr 2018)